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Summary
U.S.-Thailand relations are of interest to Congress because of Thailand’s status
as a long-time military ally, a key country in the war against terrorism in Southeast
Asia, and a significant trade and economic partner.  A proposed U.S.-Thailand  Free
Trade Agreement (FTA), currently being negotiated, would require implementing
legislation to take effect.  However, the sudden resignation of Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra in April 2006 cast uncertainty on how these U.S. priorities and
Thai politics in general would fare in the near future.
Despite differences on Burma policy and human rights issues, shared economic
and security interests have long provided the basis for U.S.-Thai cooperation.
Bangkok and Washington coordinate closely on law enforcement, intelligence, and
security cooperation.  Thailand contributed troops and support for U.S. military
operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq and was designated as a major non-NATO
ally by President Bush in December 2003.  Thailand’s airfields and ports play a
particularly important role in U.S. global military strategy, including having served
as the primary hub of the relief effort for the Indian Ocean tsunami.  The high-profile
arrest of radical Islamic leader Hambali in a joint Thai-U.S. operation in 2003
underscores Thailand’s role in the U.S.-led war on terrorism.  If negotiations for an
FTA are successful, the current U.S.-Thai bilateral trade total of $20 billion could
rise considerably.  Thailand is the United States’s 19th largest trading partner.
Despite his announcement to step down as Prime Minister, Thaksin and his
populist Thai Rak Thai party have consolidated broad control of Thai politics, as
opposition parties and others have criticized his strongman style as a threat to
Thailand’s democratic institutions. The central government’s forceful response to a
surge of violence in the southern majority-Muslim provinces also has come under fire
from many observers.  A series of attacks by insurgents, which has claimed over
1,000 lives since January 2004, has renewed concerns about both indigenous and
transnational terrorism in the country.  Some commentators have speculated that
southern Thailand could become another front in the U.S.-led war on terrorism if
more credible links to international terror networks surface or the insurgency spreads
out of the southern region.
With its favorable geographic location and broad-based economy, Thailand is
poised to play a major leadership role in Southeast Asia and has been an aggressive
advocate of increased economic integration in the region.  A founding member of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Thailand maintains close ties with
China, has reached out to India, and is actively pursuing FTAs with a number of
other countries.  Given its ties with the United States, Thailand’s stature in the region
may affect broader U.S. foreign policy objectives and prospects for further
multilateral economic and security cooperation in Southeast Asia.  In the context of
the Pentagon’s transformation and realignment initiatives, current logistical facilities
in Thailand could become more important to U.S. strategy in the region.  This report
will be updated periodically.
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Thailand: 
Background and U.S. Relations
A long-time American ally in Asia, Thailand has continued to pursue close ties
to the United States as the political landscape of the region has evolved.  Solidified
during the Cold War, the U.S.-Thai relationship strengthened on the basis of shared
economic and trade interests, and it has been further bolstered since the September
11, 2001 attacks by a common commitment to fight terrorism in Southeast Asia.  At
the same time, Thailand enjoys a strong economic and political relationship with
China, positioning itself as a potential battleground for influence in the region.
Thailand has proven itself to be a significant partner for the United States and
an important element of U.S. strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific.  Designated as
a major non-NATO ally in 2003, Thailand contributed troops and support for U.S.
military operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq.  Thailand has been an active partner
in the U.S.-led war on terrorism, a role highlighted by the high-profile 2003 arrest of
a radical Islamic leader in a joint Thai-U.S. operation.  Other bilateral cooperation
on transnational issues such as narcotics trafficking reinforces Thailand’s standing
as a primary partner of the United States in maintaining stability in Southeast Asia.
The start of negotiations in June 2004 for a U.S.-Thailand Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) marked Thailand’s possible entry into the United States’s
expanding web of trade pacts with political allies.  If the negotiations are successful
in working out a host of controversial issues, the current U.S.-Thai bilateral trade
total of $20 billion is likely to rise considerably.1  Including Thailand for FTA
consideration follows a pattern of linking FTA negotiating status with support for
U.S. foreign policy and national security goals that former U.S. Trade Representative
Robert Zoellick noted in a 2003 address.2  In Asia, the United States has concluded
FTAs with Australia and Singapore, also strong political allies who have supported
U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism.  
Thailand’s position within ASEAN makes it an appealing U.S. ally.  Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has consolidated power at home, shored up relations
with neighboring countries, and maintained strong ties with regional giants China and
India.  Before his sudden resignation in April 2006, many analysts had predicted that
Thaksin could be “the next Mahathir,” referring to the charismatic former Malaysian
Prime Minister credited with leading Malaysia’s impressive development during his
22-year tenure.  The comparison with Mahathir also reflected concerns that Thaksin
sometimes resorted to authoritarian governing methods.
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Most Recent Developments
On April 4, 2006, following months of growing political unrest, Prime Minister
Thaksin announced he would resign his post despite his Thais Love Thais (TRT)
party victory in a snap election held two days earlier.  Although initially claiming he
would remain as caretaker leader until the new parliament convenes, on April 5 he
turned power over to Deputy Prime Minister, Chitchai Wannasathit.  However, this
unexpected development did not resolve the uncertainty of the state of Thai politics.
Thaksin dissolved parliament on February 24 and called the snap election in
order to renew his mandate after months of public demonstrations calling for his
ouster.  The protestors, mostly members of the urban, educated class, were reportedly
unhappy with his authoritarian style, perceived attacks on the free press, mishandling
of the violence in the southern provinces and, most of all, the tax-free sale of his
family’s telecommunications firm to a Singapore state company in a $1.9 billion deal
that many suspected was not taxed because of Thaksin’s clout.  Opposition parties
boycotted the election, drawing 10 million “abstention” to TRT’s 16 million votes.
As a result, 38 of the parliamentary seats were not filled because of a constitutional
stipulation that the winning candidate, even if unopposed, receive at least 20% of the
eligible votes.  Concern grew following the election that Thaksin would resort to
force to quell further demonstrations, which so far have remained non-violent.
Although King Bhumibol usually avoids explicit interference into politics, there was
speculation that he urged Thaksin to resign in a meeting just hours before Thaksin’s
announcement.
It is unclear how developments will unfold in the weeks and months ahead.  The
constitution calls for parliament to convene within 30 days of an election, but 39
seats must still be filled in a by-election scheduled for April 23, 2006.  Because of
the opposition boycott, the parliament will likely be over 90% TRT members.
Thaksin has said he will remain the leader of the party, leading opposition figures to
protest that he will continue to direct Thai politics even as he steps down from the
premiership.  Protestors and opposition leaders have vowed to restart their
demonstrations if Thaksin does not leave politics completely.
Recent Challenges for Thailand
Violence in the Southern Provinces3
Since January 2004, sectarian violence between insurgents and security forces
in Thailand’s majority-Muslim provinces has left over 1,000 people dead at a rate of
about 50 killed per month.  The toll includes suspected insurgents killed by security
forces, as well as victims of the insurgents: both Buddhist Thais, particularly monks
and teachers, and local Muslims.  According to a Thai police report, 70% of the
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victims were civilians.4 The southern region, which includes the provinces of Yala,
Narathiwat, Pattani, and Songhkla, has a history of separatist violence, though the
major movements were thought to have died out in the early 1990s.  Thai Muslims
have long expressed grievances for being marginalized and discriminated against,
and the area has lagged behind the rest of Thailand in economic development.
After a series of apparently coordinated attacks in early 2004, the central
government declared martial law in the region.  A pattern of insurgent attacks —
targeted shootings or small bombs that claim a few victims at a time — and counter-
attacks by the security forces has developed.  The pattern crystallized into two major
outbreaks of violence in 2004: on April 28, Thai soldiers killed 108 insurgents,
including 34 lightly armed gunmen in a historic mosque, after they attempted to
storm several military and police outposts in coordinated attacks; and, on October 25,
84 local Muslims were killed: 6 shot during an erupting demonstration at the Tak Bai
police station and 78 apparently asphyxiated from being piled into trucks after their
arrest.5  The insurgents retaliated with a series of more gruesome killings, including
beheadings, following the Tak Bai incident.  Facing a trend of more sophisticated and
coordinated attacks, observers note that such confrontations have led to an increasing
climate of fear and division along religious lines.6
Central Government Response.  The number of security forces on the
ground has steadily increased, from an initial dispatch of 3,000 troops to over 11,000
soldiers and nearly 20,000 police by late 2005.7  In July 2005, Thaksin announced the
lifting of martial law but replaced it with a new emergency decree allowing him to
assume emergency powers, including authority to grant immunity to security
officials, hold suspects without charge for up to 30 days, and a variety of other
extraordinary measures that critics say impinge on civil liberties.8  The measure was
passed and later renewed by the TRT-controlled Parliament.  Since then, the Thaksin
Administration has set aside $16 million to purchase thousands of new M16 rifles for
use by military personnel in the region.9
In addition to the sizable military dispatch, Thaksin has adopted measures
designed to soften criticism that his policy overly stressed the use of military force.
The government has proposed  aid packages to the south and pledged to reform the
Islamic school system.  After public outcry over the deaths of Muslim youths by Thai
troops, government-commissioned independent investigations of the April and
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October 2004 incidents led to the dismissal or reassignment of some officials, but
largely acquitted the security forces of any intentional misconduct.  The Thaksin
Administration approved a $500 million economic development program for the
region, although local sources complain that the funds are slow to be dispersed.  In
March 2005, the government created the National Reconciliation Commission
(NRC), headed by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun, to address the
violence.  The NRC has recommended lifting martial law and has criticized the
executive decree as ineffective.10
Criticism of Thaksin’s Approach.  The government’s handling of the
violence has been widely criticized as ineffective and inflammatory.  Critics charge
that the Thaksin Administration has yet to put forth a sustained strategy to define and
address the problem, has repeatedly but arbitrarily shuffled leadership positions of
those charged with overseeing the region, and has failed to implement adequate
coordination between the many security and intelligence services on the ground.11
Further, measures under the emergency decree and the failure to stop the bloodshed
has bolstered local suspicion of the security forces.  Some maintain that such distrust
has led to local cooperation with the militants, a claim reinforced by a reported
incident in September 2005 in which outside militants killed two Thai marines who
had been taken hostage by a group of angry villagers.
Parties outside of the Administration have expressed concern about the
government response.  The royal family, which commands strong loyalty from the
Thai public, has taken the unusual step of publicly intervening.  In a move that may
have forced Thaksin to soften his statements, King Bhumibol Adulyadej publicly
encouraged him to take a more measured approach.  Dissent has emerged from
within the elite as well: a former prime minister and ex-Army chief have harshly
criticized the use of force.12  The chairman of the NRC claimed that the emergency
decree provided a “license to kill” for security forces.13  Opposition parliamentarians
and academics have also spoken out, but overall public support for Thaksin’s
approach remains high; 72% of respondents supported the emergency decree in a July
2005 poll.14
Multiple international human rights groups have expressed concern about
Thaksin’s handling of the situation.  A January 2006 report by Amnesty International
accused the government of unlawful methods, including “arbitrary arrest and
detention procedures; torture and ill-treatment of those arrested in relation to the
violence; failure to investigate killings and possible ‘disappearances’; and impunity
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of the security forces under the provisions of the 2005 Emergency Decree.”15  Human
Rights Watch condemned the reported use of “blacklists” of suspected militants to
force individuals to attend “re-education camps.”16
Degree of Foreign Involvement Uncertain.  Most regional observers
stress that there is no convincing evidence to date of serious Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
involvement in the attacks in the southern provinces.  In addition, the attacks have
not targeted foreigners and have remained limited to a particular geographical area..
Many experts characterize the movement as a confluence of different groups: local
separatists, Islamic radicals, organized crime, and corrupt police forces.  They stress,
however, that sectarian violence involving local Muslim grievances provides a ripe
environment for foreign groups to become more engaged in the struggle.  Such
experts have warned that outside groups, including JI and other militant Indonesia-
based groups, may attempt to exploit public outrage with events like the October
2004 deaths to forge alliances between local separatists and regional Islamic
militants.17  Pictures of Muslim casualties after the 2004 incidents were posted on an
Al Qaeda website in an apparent attempt to exploit the conflict.  Some analysts
believe that the heavy-handed response by the Thai security forces, with the open
support of Thaksin, has swayed public opinion of the southern population to support
the movement.  
Impact on Regional Relations.  Thailand’s neighbors also expressed alarm
at the brewing insurgency, breaking the ASEAN rule of broaching internal affairs at
the November 2004 ASEAN summit in Laos.  Although Thaksin resisted attempts
to add the discussion to the official agenda, Indonesia and Malaysian leaders met
with him on the sidelines to convey their concern.  Relations with Malaysia were
particularly strained after over 130 Thai Muslims fled across the border into Malaysia
in September 2005, claiming persecution by Thai security forces.  Bangkok has
demanded their repatriation, but Malaysia instead engaged the United Nations to
determine the individuals’ refugee status.  Australian Foreign Minister Alexander
Downer has noted the mishandling and pointed out the potential for JI to exploit local
grievances.18 
Coping with Tsunami Disaster
Six provinces on the western coast of southern Thailand, particularly the Phang
Nga province and the resort islands of Phuket and Phi Phi, were badly hit by sea
surges stemming from the underwater earthquake off Sumatra on December 26,
2004.  Nearly 5,400 died and over 2,800 remained missing in Thailand.  Officials
said that about half of the dead were foreign vacationers, many from Europe.  Despite
rapid reconstruction and government aid packages to the affected region, the tourism
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industry, which brings in nearly 6% of Thailand’s GDP, has suffered following the
tsunami. 
The emergency response in Thailand was praised by the international
community: United Nations and Australian relief agency officials described effective
and rapid coordination of grass-roots relief teams to distribute supplies and provide
first aid. Some credit Thaksin’s strong political authority to command the military
and police forces.  Thaksin also has come out strongly in favor of establishing a
tsunami alert system in cooperation with other regional governments.  Thailand also
appears to have met the unique diplomatic and logistical challenges of coordinating
the recovery and identification among the 38 countries that lost nationals in the
disaster.  A huge effort was launched to collect DNA samples from the dead, with
several nations sending forensic experts to assist.
Thailand served as the logistics hub for much of the U.S. and international relief
effort. U.S. relief operations by air and sea for the entire region were directed out of
Thailand’s Utapao air base and Sattahip naval base.  Thailand’s government
immediately granted full U.S. access to the bases following the disaster.
Representatives from several other countries and international organizations
providing relief also worked out of Utapao.
Background:  Thailand Politics and Government
Path to Democratization
The Kingdom of Thailand, a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form
of government, is marked by an important historical dissimilarity from its regional
neighbors.  Although occupied by Japan during World War II, Thailand was the only
country in Southeast Asia that was not colonized by Europeans, and also avoided the
wave of communist revolutions that took control of the neighboring governments of
Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s.  Thailand followed a troubled
path to democracy, enduring a series of mostly bloodless coups and multiple changes
of government in its modern history.  Although Thailand became a constitutional
monarchy in 1932, it was ruled primarily by military dictatorships until the early
1990s.  A military and bureaucratic elite controlled Thai politics during this period,
denying room for civilian democratic institutions to develop.  Brief periods of
democracy in the 1970s and 1980s ended with reassertions of military rule.  After
Thai soldiers killed at least 50 people in demonstrations demanding an end to
military dominance of the government, international and domestic pressure led to
new elections in 1992.  
Thaksin’s Government Consolidates Power
Thailand’s government, composed of the executive branch (prime minister as
head of government and the king as chief of state), a bicameral National Assembly,
and the judicial branch of three court systems, is currently led by Prime Minister
Thaksin Shinawatra of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party.  Until Thaksin’s election in
2001, the Democrat Party dominated Thai politics by instituting a series of  reforms
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that enhanced transparency, decentralized power from the urban centers, tackled
corruption, and introduced a broad range of constitutional rights.   King Bhumiphol,
who has served since 1946, commands tremendous respect and loyalty from the Thai
public and continues to exercise a degree of influence over politics in Thailand. 
The TRT party, formed by Thaksin in 1999, benefitted politically from the
devastation of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on Thailand’s economy, and the
subsequent loss of support for the ruling Democrats.  Thaksin’s populist platform
appealed to a wide cross-section of Thais, and the TRT easily secured a clear
majority in the parliament by forming a coalition with a handful of smaller parties.
The Thaksin government has bolstered its standing by carefully courting several key
power centers: the military, the business and banking elite, provincial political
bosses, and the royal family.  Many analysts contend that Thaksin and his party enjoy
power unprecedented in modern Thai politics.19  
Fueled by positive coverage of Thaksin’s response to the tsunami, the TRT won
the February 2005 parliamentary elections outright — a first in Thai politics — by
capturing 376 of the 500 seats.  The main opposition party, the Democrats, captured
only 96 seats, short of the 201 seats needed to propose a censure debate against the
prime minister.  Only in the restive South did the Democrats dominate, winning 52
of 54 seats.20  TRT swiftly dropped its former coalition party and formed a single-
party government.  
Thaksin Support Falters
Shortly after TRT’s impressive victory, however, Thaksin’s popularity faltered
due to a weak economy in the face of rising oil prices, coverage of a corruption
scandal involving Cabinet members, and his failure to stem violence in the South.
Observers note that Thaksin may have overstepped when he filed $50 million in libel
lawsuits against critic Sondhi Limthongkul, a major media owner in Thailand.
Sondhi continued to attract attention by accusing the government of massive
corruption and drawing increasingly large crowds to public protests in a popular
Bangkok park.  In the strongest indication of Thaksin’s diminished power yet,  King
Bhumibol publicly admonished Thaksin for refusing to acknowledge criticism in
December 2005.  Thaksin then withdrew the libel claims against Sondhi.  
Thaksin’s massive infrastructure modernization program has also been curtailed,
and his critics have been emboldened by his political missteps.  Despite these blows,
however, Thaksin remains popular with rural Thais because of his public works
spending programs,  and a potent opposition force has yet to develop.
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Democracy Under Fire? 
Although Thaksin retains a strong grip on power, detractors have consistently
voiced concern that his strongman style is a threat to Thailand’s democratic
institutions.  Suspicions of cronyism and charges of creeping authoritarianism have
surfaced since Thaksin took office.  Previously independent watchdog agencies have
reportedly weakened under his rule.21  Some commentators have alleged that
Thaksin’s administration has undermined anti-corruption agencies by installing
political loyalists to protect the business interests of his family and members of his
cabinet — sometimes one and the same, as Thaksin has a record of appointing
relatives and friends to prominent posts.22  Thaksin insists that political strength
enhances development, citing Singapore’s economic success and lack of political
opposition as a model for Thailand to follow.23
Outside groups have warned that press freedom has been squeezed in recent
years, documenting multiple cases in which critical journalists and news editors were
dismissed, and pointing to a libel suit against an outspoken editor filed by a
telecommunications corporation that Thaksin founded.24  Shin Corporation,
Thaksin’s family company, bought the only independent television station; the others
are owned by the government and armed forces.25  Human Rights Watch claims that
Thaksin has stifled criticism from the media of his Administration’s controversial
policies, such as the deaths of over 2,000 individuals in the government-sponsored
“war on drugs.”26
U.S.-Thailand Political and Security Relations
A Long-Standing Southeast Asian Ally
The 1954 Manila Pact of the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO), together with the 1962 Thanat-Rusk communique, forms the basis of the
long-standing U.S.-Thai security relationship.  Although SEATO was dissolved in
1977, Article IV (1) of the Manila Pact, which calls for signatories to “act to meet the
common danger” in the event of an attack in the treaty area, remains in force.
Thailand is considered to be one of the major U.S. security allies in East Asia, along
with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines.
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The U.S. security relationship with Thailand has a firm historical foundation
based on joint efforts in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the 1991 Persian
Gulf War.  Thailand sent more than 6,500 troops to serve in the United Nations
Command during the Korean War, where the Thai force suffered over 1,250
casualties.27  A decade later, the United States staged bombing raids and rescue
missions over North Vietnam and Laos from Thailand.  During the Vietnam War, up
to 50,000 U.S. troops were based on Thai soil, and U.S. assistance poured into the
country to help Thailand fight its own domestic communist insurgency.28  Thailand
also sent troops to South Vietnam and Laos to aid the U.S. effort.  The close security
ties continued throughout the Cold War, with Thailand serving as solid anti-
Communist ally in the region.  More recently, Thai ports and airfields played a
crucial role in maintaining the flow of troops, equipment, and supplies to the theater
in both the 1991 and 2003 Iraq wars.  
Support for Recent U.S. Operations. Thailand has strengthened its
partnership with the United States by contributing troops to two American military
operations and the broader war on terrorism since the September 11, 2001 attacks.
Thailand sent 130 soldiers, largely engineers, to Afghanistan to participate in the
reconstruction phase of Operation Enduring Freedom.  Thai forces are responsible
for the construction of a runway at Bagram Airbase, medical services, and some
special forces operations.29
Although Thailand remained officially neutral during the U.S.-led invasion of
Iraq, it contributed to reconstruction efforts in Iraq by dispatching over 450 troops,
including medics and engineers, to the southern city of Karbala.  The deployment
proved unpopular with the Thai public, particularly after the deaths of two soldiers
in December 2003.  In spring 2004, Thaksin threatened to withdraw the troops early
if the security situation continued to disintegrate and resisted U.S. calls to postpone
the withdrawal until after the January 2005 Iraqi elections.  The withdrawal was
completed in September 2004.
Thailand reportedly also provided a “black site” where U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency officials were allowed to secretly hold suspected terrorists.  According to
press reports, two major Al Qaeda figures captured in Pakistan were flown to
Thailand for interrogation by U.S. officials.30
U.S.-Thai Partnership Elevated.   In October 2003, President Bush
designated Thailand as a “major non-NATO ally,” a distinction which allows more
access to U.S. foreign aid and military assistance, including credit guarantees for
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major weapons purchases.31  An agreement concluded with the United States in July
2001 allows Thailand to purchase advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles for its
F-16 fighters, a first for a Southeast Asian state.32  Thaksin also authorized the
reopening of the Vietnam-era U.S. airbase in Utapao and a naval base in Sattahip,
from which the U.S. military can logistically support forces in Afghanistan and the
Middle East.
Bilateral Security Cooperation
Security Assistance.  The United States provides funds for the purchase of
weapons and equipment to the Thai military through the Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) program.  As a major non-NATO ally, Thailand also qualifies for the Excess
Defense Articles (EDA) program, which allows for the transfer of used U.S. naval
ships and aircraft.  The United States faces stiff competitors in the market for foreign
military sales in Thailand, particularly because other countries are more willing to
engage in barter trade for agricultural products.  See Table 1 below for program
funding.
Military Exercises. Thailand and the United States conduct over 40 joint
military exercises a year, including Cobra Gold, America’s largest combined military
exercise in Asia.  The 2005 drill held in Chiang Mai, with a special emphasis on
relief operations following the Indian Ocean tsunami, featured over 6,300 troops
from the United States, Thailand, Singapore, and — for the first time — Japan.
Additional observers came from China, Pakistan, Cambodia, Israel, and the United
Arab Emirates.
Training. Tens of thousands of Thai military officers, including many of those
in top leadership positions throughout the services and in the civilian agencies, have
received U.S. training under the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program.33  Designed to enhance the professionalism of foreign militaries as
well as improve defense cooperation with the United States, the program is regarded
by many as a relatively low-cost, highly effective means to achieve U.S. national
security goals.  Thailand is one of the largest recipients of IMET funding in the
world, with approximately $2.5 million annually.
Intelligence.  Intelligence cooperation between Thailand and the United States
has reportedly increased markedly since the September 11, 2001 attacks, culminating
in the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center (known as the
CTIC) in 2001.  The CTIC, which combines personnel from Thailand’s intelligence
agency and specialized branches of the military and armed forces, provides a forum
for CIA personnel to work closely with their Thai counterparts, sharing facilities and
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information daily, according to reports from Thai security officials.34  Close
cooperation in tracking Al Qaeda operatives that passed through Thailand reportedly
intensified into active pursuit of suspected terrorists following the 9/11 strikes.35  The
most public result of enhanced coordination was the arrest of suspected Jemaah
Islamiyah leader Riduan Isamuddin, also known as Hambali, outside of Bangkok in
August 2003.  Other intelligence cooperation focuses on counter-narcotics or
specialized military intelligence.
Law Enforcement.  In 1998, the International Law Enforcement Academy
(ILEA) Bangkok was established to provide legal training for officials to combat
transnational crime.36  The center is open to government officials from any Southeast
Asian country, with the exception of Burma (Myanmar), and had trained nearly 3,900
participants by December 2004.  ILEA Bangkok aims to enhance law enforcement
capabilities in each country, as well as to encourage cross-border cooperation.
Instruction for the courses is provided largely by the Royal Thai Police, the Thai
Office of the Narcotics Control Board, and various U.S. agencies, including the
Diplomatic Security Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Department of Homeland Security, and the Internal
Revenue Service.37
Counter-Narcotics. Counter-narcotics cooperation between Thailand the
United States is extensive and pre-dates the foundation of ILEA-Bangkok.
Coordination between the DEA and Thailand’s law enforcement agencies, in
conjunction with a mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition treaty, has led to
many arrests of international drug traffickers.  Specialized programs include the
establishment of Task Force 399, in which U.S. Special Forces train elite Thai units
in narcotics interdiction tactics.38
Human Rights Concerns
Some members of Congress and other U.S. officials have criticized Thailand’s
record on human rights.    The 2004 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report
asserts that Thailand’s record worsened in 2003 and cites excessive use of force by
some members of the police and links these elements to extra-judicial killings.39
Thailand has neither signed the United Nations Convention Against Torture nor
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joined the International Criminal Court. Human rights activists are particularly
critical of Thaksin’s 2003 anti-narcotics campaign, in which over 2,000 suspected
drug dealers were killed, according to press reports.  There have been some
indications of internal attention to the issue in Thailand: the National Human Rights
Commission, formed in 2000 by a mandate from the 1997 constitution to protect civil
liberties, has called on the government to review suspected abuse by Thai police.  
Concern by international human rights groups regarding abuse of criminal
suspects by Thai police forces has been exacerbated by the crackdown on Muslim
militants in the southern provinces since early 2004.  Human rights groups have
particularly cited the disappearance of Somchai Neelapaijit, a prominent Muslim
human rights lawyer, in March 2004.40   The emergency decree on administrative rule
announced in summer 2005 alarmed international rights groups further: the United
Nations Human Rights Committee, among others, has voiced concern that the
executive order and other developments are undermining Thailand’s democratic
process and human rights record.41    
U.S.-Thailand Trade and Economic Relations
Thailand, like many other countries in the region, saw its economy devastated
by the 1997 Asian financial crisis.  With loan and policy assistance from the
International Monetary Fund, Thailand has recovered substantially, although other
setbacks such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak have hurt
its progress.  GDP growth is forecast to grow to 4.5% in 2006 from an estimated
3.8% in 2005 due to high fuel costs (Thailand relies on oil for two-thirds of its
energy), and inflation is expected to slow to 4% in 2006.42  As a major recipient of
foreign direct investment, and with merchandise exports making up over half of its
GDP, Thailand’s economy depends heavily on its trading partners.
Economic relations with the United States are central to Thailand’s outward-
looking economic strategy.43  In 2003, the United States was Thailand’s largest
export market and its third largest supplier of imports, after Japan and the EU.
According to the American Chamber of Commerce, the United States is second only
to Japan in foreign investment in Thailand, with cumulative investment at $20 billion
and over 200,000 Thai nationals on the payrolls.44  In 2004, bilateral trade in goods
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totaled $23.9 billion.  Many analysts and policymakers suggest that the proposed
FTA would further deepen economic ties.45
A Protracted Process for U.S.-Thailand FTA Negotiations?
Although studies indicate that a U.S.-Thailand FTA would increase trade and
investment for both countries and yield net benefit for Thailand, negotiations must
address a list of challenging issues to reach a successful conclusion.  The agreement
sought by the United States is the most comprehensive of the multiple FTAs
Thailand has attempted; the agenda includes issues such as intellectual property
rights, investment, environment, labor rights, textiles, telecommunications,
agriculture, electronic commerce, and government procurement.46  In the six rounds
of talks held, market access for sugar, rice, and trucks are among the thorniest of the
differences between the two sides.  Further, some sources have speculated that
Thaksin launched negotiations without consulting adequately with the bureaucracies
in charge of the controversial areas.  These factors, combined with an inexperienced
Thai negotiating team, may slow the talks down considerably.47
An Aggressive FTA Strategy
Thailand has been aggressively pursuing FTAs with countries other than the
United States in its campaign to expand trading opportunities.  Agreements have
been signed with Bahrain, China, Peru, Australia, and India; the largest FTA to date
is expected to be concluded with Japan in 2006.  Further deals are possible with New
Zealand, South Korea, Chile, and the European Union (EU).  Thailand has
championed ASEAN regionalism, seeing the proposed ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement (AFTA, among ASEAN countries only) as a vehicle for investment-
driven integration which will benefit Thailand’s outward-oriented growth strategy.48
Many observers see Thailand’s pursuit of FTAs as an indication of its shift away
from multilateral approach, such as working through the World Trade Organization
(WTO), and toward a bilateral or regional approach.
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Thailand in Asia
Growing Ties with China
Chinese-Thailand ties have strengthened considerably under Thaksin’s
leadership.   Thaksin came to power promoting a business-oriented, engagement
approach toward the rest of Asia that de-emphasized human rights and democracy.49
Even while re-asserting its alliance with the United States, Thailand has continued
to court China, including signing agreements on technology, environmental
protection, and strategic cooperation.  In addition, the government has denied visas
to a group of Taiwanese legislators, a decision which Thaksin defended based on
Thailand’s close ties to China.50  Military-to-military ties have also increased through
both exchanges and arms sales: China exports major weapons and military equipment
to Thailand, continuing a practice originating in the 1980s when both countries
supported Cambodian resistance groups, including the Khmer Rouge, against the
Vietnamese-installed government in Phnom Penh.51 
Trade has boomed between Thailand and China: in 2004 bilateral trade totaled
over $17 billion, according to Chinese statistics.52  A limited free trade agreement
covering mostly agricultural goods has been in place since 2003.  Both countries have
aggressively promoted the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Zone by
pursuing joint infrastructure projects that link Thailand with China’s Yunnan
province.53  In May 2005, Thailand demonstrated its commitment to implement
promptly the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA, among China and all
ASEAN countries) by announcing it would open four new consulates in China.54 
Thailand’s strong relationship with China is based on a history far less
antagonistic than Beijing’s past with many other ASEAN countries.  After the U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam, Bangkok pursued a strategic alignment with Beijing in
order to contain Vietnamese influence in neighboring Cambodia.   Bangkok restored
diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1975, far before other Southeast Asian nations.
Thailand also has no territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, unlike
Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines.  The sizeable overseas Chinese population
in Thailand assimilated relatively easily and became a strong presence in the business
world, and eventually in the political arena as well.  Thaksin himself is the member
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of a prominent Sino-Thai family.  Thai companies were among the first to explore
investment opportunities after the Chinese economy opened up in the late 1970s,
pursuing ventures with China’s state-run enterprises. As other regional powers
tentatively began to explore commercial relationships with China, investment from
Sino-Thai companies flourished in the 1990s, fueling a rebirth of interest in Chinese
language and culture in Thailand.55
Given the simultaneous emphasis on building close relationships with the
United States and China, Thaksin’s foreign policy could be construed as a classic
hedging strategy designed to avoid dominance by any one power.  Some analysts
suggest that Bangkok’s embrace of China indicates a slow move away from the Cold
War reliance on the United States, despite enhanced cooperation in the war on
terrorism, and could be an indicator of how Southeast Asia will deal with China’s
increasing influence.56  
Divergence with U.S. on Burma (Myanmar) Policy
Bangkok’s approach toward Burma has long been seen as conflicting with U.S.
policy.  While the United States has pursued strict economic and diplomatic
sanctions against the regime, Thailand has led ASEAN’s “constructive engagement”
initiative, which favors integration and incentives to coax Burma into reform.57  For
Thailand, this policy minimizes the danger of a large-scale military struggle and
expands Thai business opportunities in Burma. 
Thailand’s relationship with Burma has grown closer under Thaksin’s
administration.  During the 1990s, Thailand voiced harsh criticism of the military
junta ruling Burma, particularly its crackdown on the National League for
Democracy, the opposition party led by democratic activist Aung Sun Su Kyi.
Thailand also has chafed at the huge inflow of illegal drugs from Burma.  But the
Thaksin government has placed special emphasis on maintaining normal relations
with Burma, even as European countries have tightened sanctions and other
Southeast Asian countries have distanced themselves from Rangoon.  In December
2004, Thaksin called the continued detention of Aung Sun Su Kyi “reasonable,”
prompting angry reactions from some U.S. lawmakers and Administration officials.
Critics have also questioned whether Thaksin’s engagement with Burma is being
driven by his own commercial interests: Shin Corp, his family’s telecom company,
has secured lucrative contracts to provide Internet service and satellite stations in
Burma.58  
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Some congressional leaders also have criticized Bangkok for its treatment of
Burmese refugees, migrant workers, and political dissents living in Thailand.  Backed
by human rights groups’ reports, some U.S. lawmakers have leveled charges of
arrests and intimidation of Burmese political activists, as well as the repatriation of
Burmese who seek political asylum.59  Congress has passed legislation that provides
money to refugees who fled Burma, particularly those in Thailand.60  
ASEAN Relations
Thailand’s positive engagement with Burma complements its broader strategy
of strengthening relations with Southeast Asian countries for economic and political
gain. Bangkok has continued to develop strong relations with its Indochina neighbors
through infrastructure assistance and other aid.   In turn, Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia provide raw materials, cheap manufacturing, and expanding markets for
Thailand.  Thaksin also has pursued enhanced relations with Singapore based on a
common interest in liberalizing trade in the region and with the Philippines centered
on a mutual interest in combating terrorism.
Relations with Indonesia and Malaysia are more complex, particularly since the
insurgency in the south has become more inflamed.  The violence has especially hurt
relations with Malaysia.  Many of the Muslim Thais are ethnically Malay and speak
Yawi, a Malay dialect.  Relations with Malaysia were significantly strained after over
130 Thai Muslims fled across the border into Malaysia in September 2005, seeking
asylum and claiming persecution by Thai security forces.  Bangkok has demanded
their repatriation, but Malaysia instead engaged the United Nations to determine the
individuals’ refugee status. The Malaysian public has grown increasingly angry at the
perceived violence against Muslims in Thailand.  This downturn in bilateral relations
followed some progress in cross-border cooperation since the violence began:
Malaysia had pledged more troops and equipment to increase border security,
conducted joint border patrols with Thai counterparts, and agreed to terminate the
joint citizenship privileges that some believe facilitate the passage of terrorists across
the border. 
Regional Health Issues
AIDS.  Thailand’s relationship with its neighbors is defined by not only
traditional security concerns but also by a series of transnational public health issues
that have afflicted the region.  Thailand was among the earliest and hardest hit by the
HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1990s, with infection spreading rapidly among the sex
worker industry and adult HIV/AIDS prevalence rates peaking at about 1.5% in 1996.
Rates are now falling, due largely to an extensive prevention campaign focused on
managing risk in the sex industry.  Cambodia undertook similar measures, but
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countries such as China and Vietnam are now threatened by equally dangerous
outbreaks, providing another potential arena for regional cooperation.61
 
SARS.  In addition to its relative success in curbing the spread of AIDS,
Thailand has been largely commended by the international health community for its
response to outbreaks of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the
avian bird flu.  Because of the importance of tourism to Thailand’s economy,
government officials have, by some accounts, been reluctant to admit a public health
problem but are generally effective once determined to address it.  In 2003, seven
cases and two deaths from SARS were reported in Thailand, but the kingdom was
removed quickly from the World Health Organization’s list of at-risk countries in
2003 after taking steps to curb the spread of the virus.  
H5N1 (Avian Flu) Virus.  Among the earliest and hardest hit by the avian flu,
Thailand has emerged as a leader in fighting the spread of the virus.  Fourteen of
Thailand’s 22 total reported cases have been fatal.  After an initially sluggish
response, including allegations by the press that government officials covered up
evidence of an outbreak,62 the Thai authorities have led the effort to respond to the
problem and particularly to facilitate regional cooperation. Considerable economic
damage from the virus has spurred Bangkok to address the problem.  Thailand’s
poultry exports, the fourth-largest in the world, bring in over $1 billion annually.
Thai authorities have taken several steps to contain the spread of avian
influenza.  Over 40 million birds were exterminated, and surveillance teams have
been deployed throughout the country.  By mid-2005, over 11,000 poultry farms
reportedly met the government’s biosecurity standards.  Thai officials acknowledge,
however, that small farms with open-air facilities, which increase the risk of
contamination, remain less regulated.  Law enforcement authorities cracked down on
illegally imported bird flu vaccines from China; the H5N1 vaccine is prohibited
because of the risk its use in poultry could lead to further mutation of the virus.63 
Thailand has promoted regional cooperation on containing the flu, proposing an
ASEAN animal hygienic fund and pledging $300,000 to start the project.  This center
would enhance cross-border surveillance and control measures, as well as serve as
an information distribution center for all ASEAN countries on the spread of the
virus.64  Public Health Minister Suchai Charoenratanakul pledged that Thailand
would contribute a minimum of 5% of its own supply to a proposed regional
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stockpile of antiviral drugs.65  Thailand also hosts platforms that are cited as key to
the U.S. government response; USAID lists two Bangkok-based organizations as
crucial implementing partners: the active regional headquarters of FAO and the
Center for Disease Control Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP).66
Potential Challenges and Opportunities 
in U.S.-Thai Relations
Progress in FTA Negotiations
Six rounds of talks have been held on the proposed U.S.-Thailand FTA, the
latest in January 2006.  If negotiations for the bilateral agreement are able to resolve
the sensitive issues outlined above, Thailand would be the third Asia-Pacific country
(after Singapore and Australia) to sign a comprehensive FTA with the United States.
An FTA would enhance Thailand’s position as a key economic as well as security
partner, advance President Bush’s Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI),67 and
encourage Thailand to support the U.S. agenda in multilateral WTO negotiations.
Failure to reach an agreement, however, would set back these initiatives and may
embarrass Prime Minister Thaksin, who has been a forceful advocate of bolstering
relations with the United States.  Some members of Congress have tied an
improvement in Thailand’s human rights record with passage of the FTA, indicating
a difficult road ahead.68
Military Transformation in Asia-Pacific
The U.S. Department of Defense initiative to transform and realign the U.S.
military around the globe provides potential opportunities for increased security
cooperation with Thailand.  Pentagon planners are breaking with the quantitative
assurance of keeping 100,000 troops on the ground in East Asia in favor of a more
mobile, capability-based force.  In the past few years, U.S. military planners have
emphasized a “places, not bases” concept in Southeast Asia in which U.S. troops can
temporarily use facilities for operations and training, without maintaining a lengthy
and costly permanent presence.  In a State Department press release, a senior Defense
Department official points to cooperation with Thailand as an example of the
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by the U.S. military in Thailand fall under the Pentagon’s “cooperative security
location” (CSL) concept, in which host countries provide access in exchange for
upgrades and other aid.70
Direction of War on Terrorism in Southeast Asia
Thailand has demonstrated its commitment to the U.S. campaign to fight
international terrorism in Southeast Asia over the past three years.  Future
developments in the regional war on terrorism may take Thailand’s role further.  If
violence in the southern provinces continues to escalate, or if links to radical Islamist
networks are revealed, Bangkok and Washington may re-evaluate the scale of the
insurgency, from a purely domestic movement to a more broadly-based effort.  Some
analysts have suggested the use of U.S. Special Forces, for example, to help Thai
military and police officers combat the violence.71  If terrorists continue strikes
elsewhere in Southeast Asia, such as the September 2004 bombing at the Australian
embassy in Jakarta, Thailand may expand its cooperation with the United States on
a broader, regional level.  Possible avenues for such coordination could include
further integration on intelligence and law enforcement work to target terrorist
operatives and financing.
CRS-20
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Thailand 2002-2006
(thousands of dollars)





CSH 1,000 1,500 0 0 0 
DA 750 1,250 0 0 0 
ESF* 0 0 0 992 0 
FMF 1,300 1,990 881 1,488 1,500 
IMET 1,650 1,768 2,572 2,500 2,400 
INCLE 4,000 3,700 2,000 1,608 1,000 
NADR 720 200 1,380 750 1,000 
Peace Corps 1,267 1,818 1,840 2,243 2,373 
PKO 0 0 500 0 0 
Totals 10,687 12,226 9,173 9,581 8,273 
Sources: U.S. Department of State, USAID, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Notes:  CSH = Child Survival Health; DA = Development Assistance; INCLE = International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement; IMET = International Military Education and Training; FMF =
Foreign Military Sales Financing; NADR = Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, & Related.
*Foreign operations appropriations for FY2005 (P.L. 108-447) provided $1.5 million in FMF to
Thailand and $1 million in ESF for programs to promote democracy and press freedoms. The
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Figure 1. Map of Thailand
